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Abstract: This paper seeks to shed light on possible changes in the government debt 
dynamics for the first 12 euro area countries. Structural breaks are present around the global 
financial crisis for most countries, but not for Germany and France, the two core countries in 
the euro area. The properties of the government debt dynamics differ markedly across the 
countries receiving bailouts.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis that broke in 2008 had a profound impact on Europe, where 
governments in many countries encountered debt financing problems. The background to the 
financial and debt crises and the subsequent policy responses are the subjects of on-going 
research (van Riet, 2010; Lane, 2012).  
 
This note analyses the dynamics of government debt from 2000 to 2013 in the 12 countries 
that have been part of the euro area since 2001 (EA12). The empirical analysis comprises a 
number of tests to ascertain whether innovations in the debt stock are persistent or are 
gradually reversed in the sample period. The tests examine whether there is counteracting 
feedback from the lagged debt stock to the fiscal stance which prevents the debt stock from 
growing without limit. The persistence of the government debt stock will inter alia be 
determined by the overall fiscal policy configuration.  
 
Tests of the time series properties of the debt stock are sometimes interpreted as tests of 
³ILVFDO VXVWDLQDELOLW\´ ZKHUH ILVFDO VXVWDinability is defined as when the transversality 
condition is satisfied, i.e. the discounted value of the outstanding debt is non-positive. 
Stationarity of the debt stock is a sufficient condition but only with a number of assumptions, 
including the behaviour of the real interest rate (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986). Bohn (2008) 
DUJXHVIRUWKLVUHDVRQWKDWWHVWVRIWKHWLPHVHULHVSURSHUWLHVDUHWHVWVRI³DG-KRFVXVWDLQDELOLW\´
and prefers instead tests based on fiscal reaction functions where the primary balance is 
regressed on the lagged debt stock and various control variables. Testing of the statistical 
significance of the coefficient of the lagged debt stock is complicated if the debt stock 
exhibits a unit root and the primary balance is stationary. Other tests associate sustainability 
with cointegration between government revenues and spending or between the debt stock and 
the primary balance (Bohn 2008).  
 
All tests of fiscal sustainability suffer, however, from two fundamental weaknesses (Bohn 
1995, 2008). First, they rely on historical data, while sustainability is a forward-looking 
concept where the transversality condition at least conceptually imposes conditions infinitely 
into the future. Second, debt financing crises typically imply that real interest rates increase 
markedly and abruptly. It is not possible to model such fluctuations in the real interest rate 
within a standard model of intertemporal sustainability and the tests discussed above therefore 
have only very limited explanatory power vis-à-vis government financing crises.  
 
Several studies ascertain the dynamics of government debt in European countries before the 
crisis (see Greiner et al., 2007, amongst many others). A few recent studies, including Cuestas 
and Staehr (2013) and Baldi and Staehr (2012), consider the effects of the crisis on fiscal 
variables, but have not considered the debt dynamics for individual countries. The 
contribution of the note is the application of tests for each EA12 country¶V debt stock 
separately, the endogenous determination of structural breaks and the use of tests allowing for 
fractional integration.  
 
 
2. Method and results  
 
The variable of interest is the government consolidated gross debt. Quarterly data spanning 
the sample 2000Q1-2013Q2 were downloaded from Eurostat (code: gov_q_ggdebt) on 18 
December 2013. The data were seasonally adjusted using the X12 (additive) procedure. 
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To test for the degree of persistence of shocks we use two methodologies; Bai and Perron 
(2003) and Gil-Alana (2008). 
 
Bai and Perron (2003) method allows us to test for the existence of breaks in the parameters, 
to determine the dates of the breaks and to estimate pre- and post-breaks parameters. In our 
framework, we estimate the relationship,  
 
ttbtb
bb
bbt
yTtIyTtI
TttITttI
TtITtIy
HtUU
tII
tDD '
 1211
21
21
)()(
)()(
)()(
 (1) 
where I(.) is the indicator function, 1D  and 2D  are the drift parameters before and after the 
break Tb, 1I  and 2I  the trend parameters before and after the break, and 1U  and 2U  the 
autoregressive parameters before and after the breaks. Bai and Perron (2003) suggest 
minimising the residual sum of squares (RSS) in equation (1).  
 
 To attain additional flexibility and robustness in the analysis, we also apply fractional 
integration techniques, for the possibility of non-integer orders of integration, while allowing 
for endogenous structural breaks. We use an approach developed by Gil-Alana (2008) under 
the assumption that the error term is white noise. This implies estimating the following 
equations, 
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where d1 and d2 are fractional differencing parameters before and after the break. The 
deterministic components are multiplied by idL)1(  , which is a simple reparameterisation; 
there is a constant and a trend in the model. The time of the break Tb is obtained by means of 
grid searches seeking to minimise the residual sum of squares from (2) and (3) for the full 
sample length (see Gil-Alana, 2008, for full details). 
 
The results of the application of the Bai and Perron (2003) method are displayed in Table 1. 
We have restricted the maximum number of breaks to one to avoid estimating an excessive 
number of parameters; in all cases we reject the condition that there is not any break (results 
available upon request). The break occurs in most cases at the time of the outbreak of the 
global financial crisis or shortly afterwards. There are some interesting exceptions. The break 
came several years before the crisis in France, but approximately two years after in Germany.1 
These results are consistent with the fact that Germany and France as the core countries of the 
euro area were among the countries that weathered the global financial crisis best. For Greece 
the break is estimated to take place in 2011Q4; this is the quarter in which the debt fell 
markedly after a debt write-down following the second support package for Greece. Finally, 
the break for Portugal also occurs late; the country also started its budget consolidation rather 
late.  
 
                                                 
1
 If two breaks were allowed, the second break for France would actually be around the time of the global 
financial crisis. One break occurs in 2005Q4 and one in 2008Q2; the estimated autoregressive parameter is -
0.343 in the first, -1.031 in the second and -0.229 in the last subsample. 
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Table 1: Unit roots with structural break  
Country Break date 1st subsample 
ȡ1 
Constant  
Trend 
2nd subsample 
ȡ2 
Constant 
Trend 
Austria 2007Q4 -1.099 
77.713 
-0.150 
-0.082 
5.973 
0.008 
Belgium 2008Q2 -0.861 
100.434 
-0.784 
-0.463 
33.995 
0.258 
Finland 2008Q3 -0.209 
10.106 
-0.086 
-0.753 
-0.029 
0.772 
France 2005Q4 -0.359 
19.140 
0.217 
-0.185 
5.920 
0.213 
Germany 2010Q3 -0.163 
9.653 
0.053 
-1.49 
114.657 
0.112 
Greece 2011Q4 0.042 
-5.767 
0.094 
-1.156 
-141.715 
6.216 
Ireland 2008Q2 -0.126 
3.881 
-0.005 
-0.273 
-18.849 
1.041 
Italy 2008Q3 -0.611 
67.535 
-0.083 
-0.621 
45.274 
0.648 
Luxembourg 2008Q3 -0.141 
0.692 
0.012 
-0.742 
1.569 
0.290 
Netherlands 2008Q3 -0.247 
13.887 
-0.061 
-1.086 
30.755 
0.864 
Portugal 2011Q1 -0.049 
2.152 
0.0644 
-1.535 
-84.276 
5.211 
Spain 2007Q3 -1.244 
77.504 
-0.970 
-0.300 
-15.873 
0.804 
Note: Bai and Perron (2003) method with at most one structural break. The table reports the autoregressive parameters, the 
constants and the trends for the two subsamples.  
 
 
We observe that the degree of persistence of shocks diminished considerably after the break 
for Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal. These results 
suggest that the debt accumulation following the crisis did not have persistent effects on the 
debt accumulation after the break. In other countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, 
Ireland and Spain, the degree of persistence increased or remained high after the break. The 
different persistence estimates in the core countries, France and Germany, after the crisis 
breaks are notable. Likewise, there are large differences among the southern crisis countries; 
persistence has decreased in Greece and Portugal, but increased in Spain.  
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Table 2 shows the results of the fractional integration test when at most one break is allowed. 
There are many similarities with the results in Table 1, but also some differences. The most 
noticeable result of the fractional integration tests is that no structural break is detected for 
Germany and France. This is consistent with the results in Table 1, which also suggested that 
the global financial crisis had little effect on the debt dynamics in these core countries of the 
euro area. In all other cases, the break is situated around the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis. Another result found in both analyses is that whereas the persistence appears to have 
fallen in Greece, the opposite is the case in Spain. The persistence results for Portugal differ 
across the two methods, but this may be attributable to the different timing of the structural 
break.  
 
 
Table 2: Fractional integration including breaks 
Country Break date 1st subsample 
d1 (95% interval) 
2nd subsample 
d2 (95% interval) 
Austria 2007Q3 0.59   (0.31,  1.26) 1.43   (0.84,  2.24) 
Belgium 2007Q4 0.41   (0.20,  0.75) 1.27   (0.96,  1.82) 
Finland 2008Q2 0.99   (0.77,  1.31) 0.61   (0.24,  0.99) 
France --- 1.49   (1.34,  1.73) 
Germany --- 1.13   (0.94,  1.40) 
Greece 2008Q2 1.07   (0.85,  1.39) 0.44   (0.09,  0.92) 
Ireland 2007Q3 1.09   (0.79,  1.56) 0.82   (0.61,  1.11) 
Italy 2008Q2 0.69   (0.41,  1.03) 1.30   (1.02,  1.59) 
Luxembourg 2008Q3 0.86   (0.65,  1.21) 0.24   (-0.41,  1.08) 
Netherlands 2008Q3 1.08   (0.89,  1.30) 0.94   (0.68,  1.33) 
Portugal 2008Q1 1.17   (0.95,  1.44) 0.44   (0.14,  0.98) 
Spain 2008Q1 -0.23  (-0.57  0.46) 1.14   (0.73,  1.77) 
Note: Gil-Alana (2008) method. In bold, evidence of reversion to trend (di < 1) 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
This note has considered the time series properties of government debt as a percentage of 
GDP in the first 12 euro area members. The analyses showed that the endogenously 
determined structural breaks in most cases were situated around or shortly after the outbreak 
of the global financial crisis. The main exceptions were Germany and France where the debt 
dynamics appear to have been influenced little by the global financial crisis. Finally, the 
southern European countries that received financial support appear to have had very different 
debt dynamics in the period after the structural break. The results are not clear-cut for 
Portugal, while persistence dropped markedly in Greece but increased in Spain.  
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